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Then, the landlord would have the burden of producing further evidence 60 to
rebut the presumption that Is motive was retaliatory. To overcome the presumption, the landlord could compare the acts or omissions of the complaining tenant
with the practices of non-complaining tenants to show that eviction s sought for
some reason other than retaliation. Also, if the landlord needs the premises for
the occupation of his family, the proof of this need should be sufficient to rebut
the presumption that the motive was retaliatory.6 1 The use of a presumption
would seemingly protect the legitimate interests of both the landlord and the
tenant. If the eviction is justified, the landlord should not be deprived of his
property rights. Likewise, the tenant should not labor under the practical difficulty of -proof which is inherent in a statute prohibiting an undesirable motive.
Legislative enactment of these basic concepts will go far 62to build a foundation
for the improvement of substandard housing in Califoria.
Samuel P. Young*
6

o See CAL. EvmENcE CODE §§ 603, 604.
61 Itis unlikely that there would be fraudulent claims here, as most landlords
would62 not want to live in substandard housing unless they actually had to.
Legislative prohibition of retaliatory eviction would avoid the problem of determining that there is a constitutional right to report violations of local laws to local
authorities. See note 6 supra.
* Member, Second Year Class.

RECOVERY FROM A THIRD PARTY UNDER CALIFORNIA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: GUIDELINES
FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
An employee works for an employer who qualifies under the local Workmen's
Compensation statute. A negligent third party, z.e. a party other than the employer,' causes an injury to the employee which arises out of and during the
course of his employment. From these simple operative facts spring a complex
array of specific legal alternatives which the interested parties may pursue. The
common law negligence remedy interacting with the statutory remedies of the
employer, his insurance carrier, and the employee create difficult legal problems.
Add the attorneys' interest in obtaining fees from the distribution of judgment
and a complex area of Workmen's Compensation results. For the purposes of this
note, third party recovery is defined as the compensation given to the injured
employee and his employer or insurance carrier for their losses.
California Labor Code section 38,56(c) provides for the distribution of fees
1

"In most ]urisdictions, the concept of 'third persons,' against whom common-law
actions may be brought for compensable injuries, includes all persons other than the
injured person's own employer
" 2 LAwSoN, Wonmi'"s COmPENSAmON LAW 170
(1961). See also CAL. LAnon CODE § 3852.
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to the employer's attorney when the employer jOinS as party plaintiff inthe employee's cause of action against the negligent third party.2 In Gurm v. U.S.
Rubber Co.,3 where the employer intervened, a Los Angeles Superior Court held
this statute unconstitutional. This fact situation presented a dilemma to the court
which is a result of a weakness inthe California statutory procedure for third
party recovery. A critical analysis of the statutory system is required to delineate
the weakness and to suggest guidelines for legislative change.
This note will (1) describe the California statutory provisions for third
party recovery, (2) analyze the reasoning of Gurzt, (3) critically compare the
California statutory provisions and other state statutes, and (4) suggest guidelines for a new statutory procedure inCalifornia.
California Statutory Provusions
Under the California statutes labeled "Subrogation of Employer,"4 a set
of interrelated statutory sections have been enacted to deal with third party recovery under Workmen's Compensation. The injured employee has several
options available: (1) he may pursue an action against the negligent third party
without requesting Workmen's Compensation; 5 (2) he may collect a compensation award including medical expenses and sue the third party subject to reimbursing the employer or insurance carrier for payments received; 6 (3) he
may join or the court may consolidate his action with the employer's action, and
the judgment or settlement will be subject to the costs of litigation and the attorneys' fees of both the employer and employee;7 (4) he may allow the employer
to pursue the action alone and recover the excess of the judgment or settlement
over the compensation payments, costs of litigation and the attorney's fee of the
8
employer.
The employer or insurance carrier upon payment of compensation may (1)
allow the employee to bring the action against the negligent third party and
claim a lien for the payments 9 (2) ]ore as party plaintiff in the employee's action and collect payments plus reasonable attorney's fees, 10 (3) pursue the action
independently, collect the costs of litigation, expenditures, and reasonable attorney's fees and pay the excess from the judgment or settlement to the employee. 1
2 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3853 provides: "If either the employee or the employer brings
an action against such third person, he shall forthwith give to the other written notice
of the action, and of the name of the court in which the action is brought by personal
service or registered mail. Proof of such service shall be filed in such action. If the
action is brought by either the employer or employee, the other may, at any time before
trial on the facts, join as party plaintiff or shall consolidate his action, if brought independently."
8 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 343 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1966) (memorandum
opinion).
4 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3850-64.
5 See CAL. LAsoR CODE § 3852.
6 CAL. LAnoR CODE §3852, 3856(b).
7
CAL. LAnoR CODE § 3853. 3856(c), 3860(e).
8 CAL. LABOR CODE §§

3856(a), 3860(d).

OCAL. LAOR CODE §§ 3856(b), 3860(b).
10 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3853, 3856(c), 3860(e).
11 CAL. LABoRa CODE § 3856(a), 3860(d).
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The net effect of the statutory provisions is to permit the employer or insurance
carrier and the employee independent causes of action coupled with an option
for intervention or a compulsory consolidation of suits if both the employer and
employee bring separate actions. Distribution of the judgment or settlement including the costs of litigation and attorney's fees are controlled by section 3856
and 3860 of the California Labor Code. Section 3856(c) provides:
If the action is prosecuted both by the employee and the employer, in a single
action or consolidated actions, and they are represented
by separate attorneys,
the court shall first order paid from any judgment for damages recovered, the
reasonable litigation expenses incurred in preparation and prosecution of such
action or actions, together with reasonable attorneys' fees based solely on the
services rendered for the benefit of both parties where they are represented by
the same attorney, and where they are represented by separate attorneys, based
solely upon the service rendered in each instance by the attorney in effecting
recovery for the benefit of the party represented.
The Gurzi Caseia
Gurzi, an employee of Marine Terminals Corporation, was injured due to the
negligence of the U.S. Rubber Company while he was unloading freight cars.
Gurzi received a Workmen's Compensation award and also brought suit against
U.S. Rubber Company claiming damages for personal injuries. Marine Terminals
intervened18 claimmg a lien on the judgment award for 7,575 dollars representing temporary compensation and medical expenses paid to Gurzi. The attorneys
for Gurzi and Marine Terminals appeared and participated separately. A judgment of 13,000 dollars was awarded to Gurzi. Marine Terminals, relying on
section 3856(c), requested that the court deduct reasonable attorney's fees of
2,000 dollars from the judgment in addition to the accrued lien of 7,950 dollars.
If the request had been granted, the injured employee would have received 3,050
dollars from which he would have to pay his own attorneys fees. The court held
that section 3856(c) was unconstitutional insofar as it allows recovery of attorney's fees by the employer. 14
The court reasoned as follows: the employee is forced to deduct the fees of
the employer's attorney from the damage award even though the employee did
not request the attorney's services; damages are a form of property which include medical expenses, compensation payments, pain and suffering, loss of
earning capacity and other items; the employer's lien only covers medical expenses and compensation payments, and thus attorney's fees for the employer
must come from that portion of the judgment which is the employee's property;
an injury has been sustained by the employee without fault.15 Therefore, the
court concluded that forcing the employee to pay the fees of the employer's
attorney is taking his property without due process of law.16 The court also stated
12 Gurn v. U.S. Rubber Co., 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 343 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.
Oct. 3, 1966) (memorandum opinion).
iS See statutes cited note 10 supra.
14 Gurzi v. U.S. Rubber Co., 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 343 (Los Angeles Super. Ct
Oct. 3, 1966) (memorandum opinion).
15 Id. at 344-47.
16 Id. at 345.
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that the statute denied the employee equal protection of the laws; even though
the employer may intervene and recover attorney's fees in the employee's action
against the negligent third party, the employee has no corresponding right to
intervene and recover attorney's fees in the employer's action against the third
party17
The employer urged that the Califorma Constitution' 8 gave the legislature
plenary power to enact Workmen's Compensation statutes and thus authorized the
taking of the employee's property. The court said "the situation
is not a
matter of workmen's compensation at all." 19 A claim for compensation does not
affect the m]ured employee's recovery against the negligent third party. "All the
workmen's compensation law seeks to do in this field is to prevent
double
"20
recovery"
How sound was the reasoning of the court? The court was correct in saying
that the Workmen's Compensation statute does not change Gurzi's remedy
against the negligent third party; but the Workmen's Compensation statute does
give the employer remedies against the thurd party because of Gurzi's employment status and his receipt of a compensation award. 21 Gurzi's acceptance of the
compensation award from Marine Terminals, therefore, brings this case under
the Workmen's Compensation statute.
It is doubtful whether the statute in question denied Gurzi equal protection
of the laws. The requirement of equal protection is satisfied "if the classification
of persons or things affected by the legislation is not arbitrary and is based
upon some difference in the classes having a substantial relation to the purpose
for which the legislation was designed."22 The Legislature has wide discretion
in classifying and the court will not overthrow the statute unless it is "arbitrary
and beyond rational doubt erroneous."23 The legislative power to create the
employer-employee classification under Workmen's Compensation has been held
constitutional. 24 Legislation controlling contracts between the employer and a
third party under Workmen's Compensation has also been held constitutional. 25
Legislative power to give the court control over the distribution of attorney's
fees has been upheld as constitutional.2 6 Extension of legislative power to control
the distribution of fees to the intervening employer's attorney does not seem to
be "arbitrary or beyond rational doubt erroneous." This extension of power is a
reasonable and rational means of protecting the employer's interest in the
'7

Ibid.

IS CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21.

19 GUrzi v. U.S. Rubber Co., supra note 14, at 346.
20 Ibid.
21

§ 3852. Cf. Board of Administration, SERS v. Ames, 215 Cal.
App. 222d 215, 29 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1963).
Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas &Elec. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 684, 693,
128 P.2d 529, 535 (1942) (statute imposing liability for attorney's fees if injunction to
restrain issuance of securities is denied).
CAL. LABOR CODE

23 Ibid.

24 Mountain

Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U.S. 361 (1920) (employer's contract with a private
insurance
company).
26
Savitt v. L. &F Constr. Co., 123 N.J.L. 149, 8 A.2d 110 (1939), modified, 124
N.J.L. 173, 10 A.2d 728 (1940).
25
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employee's judgment award after the employer has paid and the employee has
accepted the compensation award.
It is also doubtful whether Gurzi's property was taken in violation of the due
process clause. The Gurzi court stated that the employer's lien only applied to
the portion of the judgment covering compensation payments and medical expenses27 and that distribution of fees to the employer's attorney would be forced
payment of the employee's property coming from that part of the employee's
damage award which includes pain and suffering along with items not covered
by the Workmen's Compensation statute. This does not mean that the legislature
is taking property without due process of law. A legislature can deprive a person
of property in the valid exercise of the state's police power. An example is the
Workmen's Compensation award itself.28 The difficulty is determining when the
legislature in the exercise of this police power violates the due process clause.
The United States Supreme Court has said that it leaves "debatable issues as
"29
respects business, economic, and social affairs to [state] legislative decision.
The statute mi question must be unreasonable and arbitrary as considered by a
"rational legislator." 0 Since the employee has voluntarily claimed and accepted
the compensation award, it is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary for the legislature to protect the employer's interest in the ]udgment when a negligent third
party causes the injury. Extension of this protection to include the expenses of
an attorney seems to be a debatable issue and should not be considered an
arbitrary exercise of the state legislative power.
Although the reasoning of the court is questionable, the court reached a
just result. When other statutory alternatives are examined, the injustice to the
employee resulting from intervention by the employer or insurance carrier becomes apparent. The unreasonable aspect of section 3856(c) appears when this
section is compared with sections 3856(a) 3 1 and (b) 32 When the employer
27The court's reasoning in dividing the award into components (medical expenses,
disability, pain and suffenng, etc.) to distribute the judgment is questionable. In Heaton
v. Kerlan, 27 Cal. 2d 716, 166 P.2d 857 (1946), Justice Traynor construed the language
"first lien against the entire amount of any judgment for any damages" as meaning that
the employer's lien was applicable to the total judgment, thus making it unnecessary
to divide the judgment into components. Id. at 723, 166 P.2d 861. The statutory language
construed in this case appears in Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 90, § 3856, at 274. CAL. LAnOR
CoDn § 3856(b) now provides for a "first lien against the amount of such judgment
for damages."
28See Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919); Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188
(1917).
2
9Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952).
80

ScwARTz, A COwavwNTARy ON THE CoNsTrruinoN OF THE UNrr=

STATES,

II THE RIGHTS OF PRoPERTY 59 (1965).
31 CAL. LABOR CoDE § 3856(a) provides: "If the action is prosecuted by the
employer alone, the court shall first order paid from any judgment
reasonable litigation expenses
together with a reasonable attorney's fee
After the payment
of such expenses and attorney's fees, the court shall
reimburse the employer for
the amount of his expenditure for compensation
and shall order any excess paid
"
to the8 2injured employee
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3856(b) provides: "If the action is prosecuted by the
employee alone, the court shall first order paid from any judgment
reasonable litiga-

PART
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alone pursues the action against the negligent third party under section 3856(a),
the employee's recovery can be represented by the following equation:
(a)

Employee's recovery = Judgment - Litigation expenses - Employer's
attorney's fees - Compensation expenditures.
When the employee alone pursues the action against the third party under section 3856(b), the employee's recovery can be represented as follows:
(b) Employee's recovery = Judgment - Litigation expenses - Employee's
attorney's fees - Compensation expenditures.
When the employer intervenes in the employee's action against the negligent
third party distribution of the judgment is controlled by section 3856(c) which
was ruled unconstitutional in Gurzt, and the employee's recovery is as follows:
(c) Employee's recovery = Judgment - Litigation expenses - Employee's
attorney's fees - Intervening employer's attorney's fees - Compensation expenditures.
Assume that the judgment would be the same whether the action was pursued by
the employer's or employee's attorney. Also assume that when pursued to judgment by a single attorney, the attorney's fees would be the same whether the
action was pursued by the employer's or employee's attorney, .e. the fees of the
employer's attorney in case (a), and the fees of the employee's attorney in cases
(b) and (c) would be the same. 3 Applying these assumptions, the employee's
recovery is reduced by the amount of the fee paid to the intervening employer's
attorney. The employee is prejudiced by the fact that the employer chose to
intervene.
The facts and reasoning of the Gurzi case point out a troublesome area in
the third party recovery statutes of California. The problem is whether the
employer should be given the privilege of intervening in the employee's cause
of action. An employer has a dual purpose in intervening; (1) to seek reimbursement of his compensation payments from the judgment, and (2) to assure proper
prosecution of the employee's negligence action against the third party. Section
3856(b) of the California Labor Code allows the employer a first lien on the
judgment for the employer's compensation expenditures.8 4 In Chase v. Southern
Pacific Co.,3 5 the court held that an insurance earner's lien under Workmen's
Compensation will be protected. The court stated that the carrier did not have
to sue or intervene to protect his first lien.30 The employer, a fortion, will receive
protection without recourse to intervention.
Depriving the employer of the privilege of intervention after payment of
compensation is a serious step. The employer would be without legal recourse if
tion expenses
together with a reasonable attorney's fee
After the payment of
such expenses and attorney's fee the court shall, on application of the employer, allow
as a first lien against the amount of such judgment for damages, the amount of the employer's expenditure for compensation
83 This assumes that the parties involved would engage in the same type of contract
for the
attorney's services.
84
Statute quoted note 32 supra.
366 Cal. App. 2d 273, 43 P.2d 1108 (1935). This case construes "first lien" in
Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 1119, § 1, at 2370.
86 6 Cal. App. 2d at 277, 43 P.2d at 1110.
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he felt that the employee's cause of action was being handled poorly. Before
such a step is taken, an analysis of the factors underlying third party actions3 7
and a classification of statutory enactments is required.
Thtrd Party Actions38

Four postulates provide the theoretical basis for third party actions. First, the
ultimate loss should fall on the wrongdoer.3 9 Second, the injured employee should
be compensated for his injury. Third, double recovery by the injured employee
is undesirable. 40 Finally, the negligent party should not be subjected to undue
hardship, i.e. the cause of action should be settled in one suit.41 Postulates one and
two protect !he interests of the injured employee. Postulates one and three protect the employer or insurance carrier. Postulate four protects the third party
from multiple suits.
Out of these simple requirements spring a diverse array of statutory enactments. Classifying the statutes is an extremely difficult 42 and hazardous task but
it is necessary to compare statutory alternatives. Classification is hazardous because
of the difficulties of statutory construction. Many states have recently revised
their third party recovery statutes and hence the statutory language has not
been construed by the courts,
For the purposes of this survey, third party statutes will be divided into six
groups:4
1) Two states require the injured employee's election of either accepting a
compensation award or pursuing an action against the third party. A
claim or acceptance of compensation subrogates the employer to the
44
rights of the employee;
37
For the purposes of this note, third party actions are defined as the delineation
under local Workmen's Compensation statutes of the legal interests-rights, powers,
privileges and immunities-of the employer, insurance carrier, injured employee and

the negligent
third party.
3

8For a general discussion see 2 LAwSoN, Woianuds CouPENsATioN LAw ch. XIV
(1961); 3 ScHNEmEn, WomavrEN's COmYENSATiON Txr ch. 15 (1943, Supp. 1959);
Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here and
Abroad, 42 CA . L. Bxv. 531, 559-78 (1954).
3
9 "The basic concept underlying third party actions is the simple moral idea that
the ultimate loss from wrongdoing should fall upon the wrongdoer" 2 LAsoN, op. cit.
supra note 37, at 165.

40'It is equally elementary that the claimant should not be allowed to keep the
entire amount both of his compensation award and of inscommon-law damage recovery"
Id. at 166.
4
1 Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 12 U. CQ. L. RExv. 231, 242 (1945).
42
Riesenfeld, supra note 37, at 569.
4
8 Two states, Ohio and West Virgima, have no statutory provisions for third
party actions.
44
IDAno CoDE AwN. § 72-204 (1947); Txx. Rmv. Civ. STAT. Asx. art. 8306,
§§ 3, 3a and art. 8307, § 6a (1967). These statutes do not assure the injured employee
an amount equal to a compensation award if the employee elects to pursue a cause
of action against the third party. However, when compensation is awarded and the
employer receives a judgment, the employee receives any excess of the judgment over
the cost of enforcement and the employer's compensation expenditures.

March, 19671

NOTES

2) Three states require the employee's election between receiving a compensation award or pursuing an action against the third party, but assure
45
the employee of at least the amount of the compensation award;
3) Four states consider acceptance of the compensation award as an assignment or subrogation of rights to the employer or insurance earner for a
limited period of time, after winch the cause of action may be pursued
by the employee; 6
4) Eighteen states allow the employee to collect the compensation award
and pursue an action against the tbird party. When the employee fails
to bring suit or settle within a specified period, the power to pursue the
action is shifted to the employer or insurance carner;4 7
5) Five states do not require election but control double recovery by making
receipt of compensation a limited assignment of the cause of action or by
48
controlling the distribution of the employee's judgment;
6) Ten states allow the employer or the insurance carner's action and the
employee's cause of action to coexist. Most states require joinder of the
49
two suits when brought independently.
45
A=z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1023 (Supp. 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANx. § 81-13-8
(1963); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (1951).
4
0ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 68 (1964) (thirty days after employee's written
demand); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1964) (two months after compensation
award); MAss. GEr. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 15 (Supp. 1966) (fifteen months after injury); S.C. CODE AN. §§ 72-124, -126 (1962) (three months after employees request).
4
'ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 312 (Supp. 1965) (employer has six months after the
statute of limitations); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015 (Supp. 1966) (one year after compensation award); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2363 (Supp. 1964) (two hundred sixty
days after injury); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39 (Supp. 1966) (one year after the action
exists then for two years to the employer); HAwAiI REv. LAws § 97-8 (Supp. 1963)
(nine months after injury); ILL. ANx. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1966) (three months before the statute of limitations); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1213
(1965) (two years after the cause of action accrues); IowA CODE ANN. § 85.22 (1949)
as amended, IowA CODE A x. § 85.22 (Supp. 1966) (ninety days after written notice);
KAx. GE. STAT. ANN. § 44-504 (1964) (one year from injury or 18 mos. from injury
if employee dies); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.189 (1960) (one year from injury); MONT.
RPv. Conin ANN. § 92-204 (1964) (six months after injury); N.H. 1Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ 281.14 (1966) (nine months after injury); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (1959) (one
year after the accident); N.Y. Woxi~ms Cou. L.w § 29 (McKinney 1965) (six
months after award within thirty days after notice ); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1965)
(twelve months from injury with reversion sixty days before the statute of limitations);
N.D. CEiNr. CODE § 65-01-09 (Supp. 1965) (sixty days from injury to carner, sixty days
later to employer); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (1966) (one year after injury with
employer allowed six months to sue); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 624 (Supp. 1965) (one
year after injury).
48
N.M. STAT. AwN. § 59-10-25 (Supp. 1965) (assignment); R.I. GEN. LAws AwN.
§ 28-35-58 (Supp. 1966) (subrogation); S.D. CODE § 64.0301 (1939) (power to collect);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1966) (employer or insurance earner becomes trustee of
the employee); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-54 (1959) (control on distribution of employee's
judgment).
49 Ar. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 (1960) (all claims determined in one suit after
reasonable notice); CAL. LABoR CODE §§ 3852-60; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-293
(1961) (failure to join after notice abates the action); LA. 1Ev. STAT. §§ 23:1101-03

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

The remaining states have statutory provisions winch are difficult to classify.5°
It should be noted that the above classification does not cover the many possible
vanations in statutory provisions. 51
The injured employee is placed in a dilemma if the statute requires an election
of remedies and does not assure him at least the payment of the compensation
award for the particular injury. Election to pursue a third party negligence action
is based on the hope that the judgment (less litigation costs and attorney's fees)
will be greater than the compensation award. Some statutes (states in group two)
assure the employee at least the amount of the compensation award. 2 This
type of statute protects the employee but can result in a loss to the employer if
the jury award in the negligence action is less than the compensation payments.
Some states have modified the strict election doctrine because of the hardships
placed on the employee. 58 In these states, election to accept compensation transfers the power to pursue the cause of action to the employer. A provision is
usually added which requires distribution of any excess in the judgment award
over the compensation payments and medical expenses to the employee. However,
this type of statute sometimes leads to a result which is prejudicial to the employee. The employer wishes to settle for the value of his expenditures; the
employee, however, desires complete compensation. Thus some states no longer
require election but permit the employee recovery of a compensation award and
allow pursuit of the negligence action. 54 Protection is given to the employer by
transferring the power to him when the employee fails to bring suit within a
specified time period. California, along with other states, 56 allow coexistent causes
of action with joinder provisions when either the employer or employee brings a
(1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-36 (1952) (all claims determined in one suit after
reasonable notice); Mo. ANNt. STAT. § 287.150 (1965) (no joinder requirement stated);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-118 (1960) (joinder required when compensation paid and
employee brings suit); NEY. RIv. STAT. § 616.560 (1963) (no joinder requirement
stated); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65-38, -39 (Supp. 1966) (no joinder requirement stated);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (1957) (after reasonable notice all claims determined in one
suit).
50
GA. CODE ANN. § 114-403 (Supp. 1966); Ky. 1Ev. STAT. § 342.055 (1962);
MwrN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (1966); OBE. REv. STAT. §§ 656.576-83 (1965); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Supp. 1966); WAsH. R v. CODE ANN. § 51.24.010 (1962).
5i Statutes vary as to distribution of attorneys' fees, costs of litigation, settlement
provisions and requirements of notice. One state in group four provides the employer
with incentive to diligently pursue the employee's cause of action by permitting the
employer one-third the balance remaining after the compensation payments, medical
expenses and reasonable expenditures have been deducted. N.Y. Woamvwds Comp.
LAws § 29 (McKinney 1965). Another state in group four provides that if the employee
brings suit, the employer may recover only half of the compensation award and medical
expenses; if the employee fails to pursue the cause of action and the employer brings
suit, the employer is entitled to reimbursement for the full amount of his expenditures.
MoNr. REv. CODES ANIM. § 92-204 (1964). This sample of variations indicates the possibility of an almost infinite number of variations.

52Statutes
"Statutes
54
Statutes
55
r Statutes

cited note
cited note
cited note
cited-note

45
46
47
49

supra.
supra.
supra.
supra.
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separate action or intervenes. This type of statute favors the employer by allowing
him several options. Once compensation is paid, the employer has a means of
exercising control over the pursuit of the negligence action either by suing the
third party himself or intervening in the employee's action. By allowing intervention an additional expense (employer's attorney's fees) is added which reduces
the recovery of the employee.

Conclusion
Califorma should discard the present system of statutory subrogation of the
employer and its concept of intervention and coexisting causes of action. The
Gurzz case points out the weaknesses of the present system. These weaknesses
include the possibility of additional litigation and a result prejudicial to the
employee. Additional litigation stems from intervention and the presence of
two attorneys. As a consequence, a dispute over what are reasonable attorney's
fees and the manner of distribution arises. In addition, the employee is required
to pay the fees of the employer's attorney when the employee had no control
over the employer's entry into the suit and may not receive any benefits from
the intervention. Analysis of other state statutes indicates that the California
statute favors the employer or insurance earner and thus violates the fundamental
purpose of Workmen's Compensation. The fundamental purpose of Workmen's
Compensation is to protect and compensate the employee. The intervention
procedure in California leads to a result which is prejudicial to the injured employee.
Legislation is necessary to replace the present statutory procedure. To pose
guidelines for this legislation, a priority of postulates must be established. A
third party recovery statute should: first, compensate the injured employee
fully; second, reimburse the employer or insurance earner fully; and third, cause
the mmnum of hardship on the negligent third party. The statute itself should
satisfy the following guidelines:
1) The employee need not elect between compensation and the common
law action for negligence;
2) Acceptance of compensation by the employee gives the employer or insurance earner the power to apply for a lien which will be protected by
the courts without the necessity of intervention or active representation in
a suit;
3) For a stated statutory period, the employee should have the exclusive
power to institute suit and pursue the action to judgment. Settlement
within this period would require consent of the court and the employer
or the insurance earner;
4) Failure by the employee to pursue the action within a stated period will
transfer the power to institute the suit to the employer or the insurance
carrier;
5) When the judgment awarded is less than the compensation award, litigation expenses and attorney's fees, the court should have the power by
statute to order a new trial unless the negligent third party agrees to pay

